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Abstract  
The UK general election result in 2010 produced a hung or balanced parliament for the first 
time in over three decades.  Since the UK has limited post-war experience of this outcome it 
is natural that commentators have begun to look elsewhere for lessons on the practicalities of 
minority and coalition government.  This paper considers the lessons we can learn from the 
Scottish parliamentary experience since 1999.  It outlines two main points of comparison: 
strength and stability.  We might assume that coalition provides more of both than minority 
government.  Indeed, for that reason, it is rare for UK or devolved governments in the UK to 
operate as minorities through choice.  Yet, the Scottish experience shows that the differences 
between coalition and minority government are not completely straightforward.  Much 
depends on the institutional context and, in many cases, idiosyncratic elements of particular 
systems. Consequently, we can identify a trade-off in comparative analysis: as our 
identification of elements specific to one system increases, our ability to draw clear 
meaningful lessons decreases.
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The UK general election of 2010 has produced its first hung parliament since 1974 and 
commentators have begun to look elsewhere for lessons on the practicalities of minority and 
coalition government.  The search for lessons may be specific and focused on elements most 
relevant to the UK’s ‘majoritarian’ history.  Two features of the Westminster system stand 
out.  First, it usually produces a ‘strong’ government: it is able to make decisions and initiate 
policy change quickly, without significant opposition.  The ‘Westminster model’ suggests 
that power resides within the centre: the electoral system produces exaggerated majorities, 
allowing the single party in government to dominate Parliament; the government is run by 
ministers that direct civil servants in departments and by the Prime Minister who controls the 
appointment of ministers.  While this image of UK government is now treated as a caricature, 
and the literature on governance uses it as a way to describe what doesn’t happen,i the idea of 
strong centralised government is still powerful and lessons may be sought to ensure a set-up 
that is as close to the Westminster ideal as possible.  Second, it produces relative stability.  In 
parliamentary democracies, the average tenure of a single party majority is 30 months, 
compared to 17-18 months for coalitions and 13-14 months for minority governments.
ii
  
These features were highlighted as the most important requirements for a UK government by 
both David Cameron and Gordon Brown in the aftermath of the election result. 
This paper considers the lessons on strength and stability that we can learn from the Scottish 
parliamentary experience since 1999.  We might assume that coalition provides more of both 
than minority government.  Indeed, it is rare for UK or devolved governments in the UK to 
operate as minorities through choice (particularly given its chequered history).  Yet, the 
Scottish experience shows that the differences between coalition and minority government 
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are not completely straightforward.  Strength may refer to the ability of a government to 
dominate Parliament and its legislative process, but may come at the expense of a single 
party’s ability to dominate ministerial office and the levers of government.  Stability may 
arise from relative immunity to defeats and (in particular) votes of no confidence in 
Parliament but may be tempered by instability and tension within the machinery of 
government.  Much depends on the institutional context and, in many cases, idiosyncratic 
elements of particular systems. In other words, we need to identify why particular governing 
structures produce strength and stability and if those results are likely to be replicated 
elsewhere.  The Scottish Parliament shares many features with Westminster (including a 
‘Westminster culture’ of party tribalism, particularly in the early years when many MPs 
became MSPs) despite its architects using ‘old Westminster’ as a source of negative lessons 
for Scotland’s ‘new politics’.iii  However, key differences remain, such as a more 
proportional electoral system that virtually guarantees coalition or minority government.  
Consequently, we can identify a basic dilemma in comparative analysis and our efforts 
towards ‘lesson drawing’iv: as our identification of elements specific to the Scottish system 
increases, the process of drawing meaningful lessons for Westminster becomes more 
complicated. 
The strength and stability of coalition governments  
One key difference between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster is that the former was 
designed to be relatively strong, in terms of possessing mechanisms to improve policy 
scrutiny and the ability of committees to set the policy agenda.  It is certainly strong 
according to Strøm’s criteria.v  It has permanent and specialized committees with relatively 
small numbers of members (to foster a collective identity), a combined standing and select 
committee function (to foster policy expertise within them), a proportional (by party) number 
of convenors (chairs) selected by a committee, a committee role before the initial and final 
plenary stages of legislative scrutiny (to foster parliamentary deliberation), the ability of 
committees to initiate and redraft bills (although perhaps only as a last resort), and the power 
to invite witnesses, demand government documents and oversee pre-legislative consultation.  
Yet, the Scottish Parliament did not prove to be strong when compared to the Scottish 
Executive (renamed the ‘Scottish Government’ by the SNP in 2007).  Rather, from 1999-
2007, the Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition operated in much the same way as 
a single party majoritarian government in Westminster, passing an extensive programme of 
legislation with virtually no effective opposition.
vi
   
From 1999-2007 the coalition provided government strength in terms of its relationship with 
the Scottish Parliament.  Its command of parliamentary seats was sufficient in both sessions.  
In 1999 it controlled 56% of the 129 seats (Labour 56 seats and 43.4%, Liberal Democrat 16 
(plus the Presiding Officer), 12.4%).  In 2003 it controlled 52% (Labour 50, 39% and Liberal 
Democrat 17, 13%).   The coalition enjoyed a majority in plenary and used it to secure a 
majority in all select committees.  Its impressive party whip and the high degree of voting 
cohesion within the coalition also ensured stability.  There was no equivalent in Scotland to 
the series of rebellions by Labour MPs in Westminster, partly because Labour MSPs were 
screened before their selection and because Labour ministers held meetings with Labour 
MSPs before committee meetings.  There were also few instances of Liberal Democrat 
dissent (and none which threatened the coalition’s Partnership Agreement).  The coalition 
gave Labour the sense of control that they feared would be lost if they formed a minority 
government and were forced to cooperate on a regular basis with other parties.   Instead, the 
coalition produced successive partnership agreements that tied both parties to a detailed 
programme of legislation and towards supporting the Scottish Executive line (and collective 
cabinet responsibility) throughout. The effect of coalition dominance was dramatic.  It 
controlled the voting process in both committees and plenary.  The parties were able to 
dictate which of their members became convenors of committees and even which MSPs sat 
on particular committees. As a result, the independent role of committees was undermined as 
MSPs were subject to committee appointment and then whipped, while committee turnover 
was too high to allow a meaningful level of MSP subject expertise.   
The Scottish Executive presided over a punishing legislative schedule, producing a sense in 
which committees became part of a ‘legislative sausage machine’ rather than powerful bodies 
able to set the agenda through the inquiry process.  While there is some evidence of 
parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation, the Scottish Executive 
produced and amended the majority of bills and the government-versus-opposition 
atmosphere undermined any meaningful sense of power sharing between executive and 
legislature.    The Scottish Parliament and its committees enjoyed neither the resources with 
which to scrutinise government policy effectively, set the agenda and initiate legislation, nor 
the independence from parties necessary to assert their new powers.  Overall, the experience 
was heartening for a Scottish Labour party that prized above all else a ‘settled programme’ 
and feared the prospect of political embarrassment from political ambushes led by the SNP 
that they feared and loathed so much. 
Identifying strength and stability within the coalition is a separate matter.  The price that 
Labour paid for a settled legislative programme was systematic cooperation, and the need to 
compromise, with the Liberal Democrats.  The process of compromise was made easier by 
the ideological closeness between the parties, but a number of issues demonstrate the 
unpredictability of outcomes.  On the one hand, the overall experience shows that the Liberal 
Democrats, as the smaller party, was willing to live with major policy compromises to secure 
a small number of key aims.  For example, although it favoured the abolition of higher 
education tuition fees, it accepted the abolition of up-front fees combined with a reduction in 
the graduate contribution or ‘endowment’ (£2000 for 4 years at University).  It also accepted 
from 2003 a shift in direction of justice policy towards populism and an agenda on tackling 
anti-social behaviour, despite the fact that it had secured from 1999-2003 (during Deputy 
First Minister Jim Wallace’s term as Justice minister) a different approach and key 
differences with the UK on issues such as freedom of information.
vii
   In part, it did so to 
secure its aim of PR in local government elections (note that Labour agreed to legislate to 
make this possible from 2007; in the UK the deal is merely to allow a referendum on AV, 
with Conservative MPs free to argue against it).   
On the other hand, the example of free personal care for older people demonstrates the 
potential instability of coalition government.  In this case, Scottish Labour decided initially to 
follow the UK Government by rejecting the Sutherland report’s recommendation of free care 
(not least because UK Labour ministers put pressure on them to do so).  Yet, the Liberal 
Democrats favoured the policy and threatened to break ranks and join forces with the SNP 
and Conservatives to pursue the matter through legislation.  The outcome was a Labour 
reversal, with Henry McLeish (First Minister) famously appearing on Newsnight Scotland to 
claim the decision for himself.  The example demonstrates that coalition governments can 
survive such periods of instability, although it is difficult to know how far these matters can 
go before the coalition breaks down.  In this case, Scottish Labour was sympathetic to 
Sutherland and backed down to ensure governing stability.  In other cases, such as the future 
of nuclear power, the parties agreed to defer a decision beyond their period of government 
because they could not agree.   
The wider process of cooperation involved systematic policy coordination, in which both 
parties were to be consulted routinely on major policy decisions and decisions made by 
ministers within individual departments, requiring extensive information sharing and 
permission-seeking between civil servants in all departments.  At face value, this requirement 
may seem rather appealing.  A major theme in UK policymaking is that, despite a 
commitment to sharing information, the government consists of a series of policy silos 
organised around departments.  Each department has its own aims, constituencies and policy 
networks and joined up government has often remained elusive, despite attempts by the New 
Labour Government to pursue its ‘modernization’ agenda through cross-cutting targets 
coordinated from No.10 and then by the Treasury through public service agreements.  Yet, 
the Scottish experience does not give a clear sense that a UK coalition government will 
improve policy coordination.  In part, this is because Scottish negotiations took place in a 
different context (not only because the Executive is smaller, with fewer responsibilities).  The 
legacy of the Scottish Office (the pre-devolution UK government department) arrangement, 
in which there were few ministers, is that ministerial responsibilities spanned multiple 
government departments.  The greater potential for joined up government was already there.  
However, there was still evidence that policy silos existed (for example, higher education or 
agricultural networks were not altered significantly when combined with other issues in new 
departments), while the cross-departmental arrangements often produced evidence of 
confusion over which agencies or quangos were responsible to particular ministers.  The 
classic example arose when the Scottish Qualifications Authority failed to produce reliable 
exam results and no-one knew exactly which minister to hold accountable.  In other words, 
Scotland may be better at providing a cautionary tale: a coalition government’s increase in 
reporting and accountability arrangements may exacerbate the sense of diminished individual 
ministerial responsibility that we now find in the era of multi-level governance.  
The Scottish experience can also provide lessons on the limits to collective cabinet 
responsibility.
viii
  On the whole, the partnership agreement, combined with a commitment to 
cooperate, ensured that few major issues of public disagreement arose (indeed, Labour party 
dissent and in-fighting was more worrying than disagreements between the parties).  In 
theory, the convention is that when a decision has been reached by Cabinet, all members are 
obliged to defend it publicly.  In practice there are always grey areas and the conventional 
limits take time to define.    For example, the first major test in Scotland involved ministers 
addressing constituency matters on an issue (specific hospital closures) that had an indirect 
link to government policy (the centralisation of certain NHS services).  A minister expressed 
opposition to the hospital reorganisation plans of a health board (approved by the Scottish 
Executive) but voted with the Scottish Executive in Parliament and remained in government; 
a Ministerial Parliamentary Aide voted against the Executive and resigned.  Thus, the 
parliamentary vote appears to be the line in the sand.  This conclusion was reinforced during 
similar debates such as the firefighter dispute in 2003.  It is also supported by the outcome of 
debates on reserved issues such as Trident, the Iraq War and ‘dawn raids’ on failed asylum 
seekers.    While ministers were relatively free to criticise UK government policy (since they 
were not bound to CCR as members of the UK cabinet), they were still expected to resign if 
they voted against the Executive in a Scottish Parliamentary motion.  For example, Malcolm 
Chisholm remained a Labour minister after criticising directly, on TV, the UK Government 
policy on asylum, but resigned when voting with the SNP on a motion to oppose Trident 
bases in Scotland.  In most cases, the convention was breached by Labour and not, as 
expected, Liberal Democrat MSPs (who were relatively free to criticise key UK policies 
while remaining in the coalition).  In some cases, we can perhaps relate it to the feeling 
among members of the largest party that their message is being diluted through coalition.  
The sense of exclusion caused by coalition may produce more tensions within a party than 
across them.   
The strength and stability of minority governments 
The Scottish experience of minority government from 2007 provides fewer direct lessons for 
the UK, but it highlights to some extent a trade-off between strength and stability in 
Parliament versus strength and stability in government.  The SNP minority government 
commands only 47 seats (36%) and, whilst vulnerable to motions of no confidence (a simple 
majority is required to oblige the executive to resign), has not faced any.  It has lasted well 
beyond the international average and should complete a full 4-year term.  Its minority status 
has made it relatively ‘weak’ in terms of its relationship with the other parties in Parliament 
(in both plenary and committees) but there have been surprisingly few instances of real 
problems that threaten its governing status (particularly when there is still a strong 
government-versus-opposition tone in plenary and the opposition parties often suggest that 
SNP ministers are lying in Parliament).  
The SNP has had to drop some legislation for which it does not have parliamentary support.  
Most significantly, it dropped its commitment to introduce a bill to produce a referendum on 
independence when the three other parties refused to support it.  It also dropped its plans to 
pursue a local income tax to replace the council tax when it could not secure the support of 
the Liberal Democrats (there were also problems related to the loss of council tax benefits, 
amounting to £4-500m).   However, it has had some high profile successes, including a bill to 
abolish the graduate endowment (and, less importantly, to abolish bridge tolls).  Overall, it 
has produced a respectable number of bills (it will likely produce 40 in 4 years, compared to 
50 and 53 in previous sessions) in the context of its commitment to reduce legislation (there 
was a widely held perception in the Scottish Parliament that there was too much from 1999-
2007) and govern competently rather than seek innovation constantly.  Its ability to pass so 
many bills reflects the fact that a large proportion of government business in Parliament is 
rather innocuous.  There is little incentive for the opposition parties to oppose the principles 
of, for example, a bill reforming flooding policy.  The SNP also inherited many bills from its 
predecessor government (on issues such as the need to prepare for the commonwealth games, 
reform the judiciary and courts, reform public health law, and revise the law on sexual 
offences).   
The SNP loses many parliamentary motions, but most are non-binding motions that merely 
set the agenda for the Scottish Government.  Indeed, following a motion in 2007 calling on 
the Scottish Government to fund the Edinburgh Airport Rail Link and tram project, Alex 
Salmond drew on comments made by former First Minister Donald Dewar to suggest that he 
was not bound by parliamentary motions (the trams were funded but EARL was not).   SNP 
whips and business managers have since sought to avoid similar confrontations by 
negotiating the wording of motions with their counterparts in other parties and acting on 
many motions.  It is more vulnerable to opposition party amendments to its legislation, but 
‘wrecking’ amendments are subject to stricter rules than in Westminster amendments’ 
(amendments that threaten the spirit and tone of the bill are rejected by the Presiding Officer 
or committee convenors) and, in some cases, there is a limit to the overall cost of a bill’s 
provisions.   
Overall, the approach taken by the other parties is that the SNP may often be doing the wrong 
thing but it has the right to try.  A common or ideal image of minority politics suggests that 
parties take a positive attitude towards cooperation; they find reasons to pursue common 
policy ground.  While parties will disagree on many issues overall, a minority government 
should be able to form a series of deals with different parties at different times.  The Scottish 
Parliament may not live up to this consensus democracy ideal, but parties with a majoritarian 
history and culture do the next best thing: they work within the confines set by minority 
government, taking on the traditional Westminster role of parliamentary scrutiny and 
opposition without initiating much legislation or representing an alternative source of policy 
initiation, even in high profile cases with significant policy distance between the Scottish 
Government and Parliament.  For example, while the three opposition parties were heavily 
critical of the Scottish Government’s decision to release the Lockerbie bomber on 
compassionate grounds, they did not seek to overturn the decision.    
Some of the stability of minority government can also be traced to the informal coalition 
between the SNP and the Scottish Conservative party.  The Conservatives have voted with 
the SNP on a staggering 72% of parliamentary motions since 2007 (compared to 94% 
agreement between Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat from 2003-7).
ix
 The effect of 
Conservative support has varied because it is not sufficient to command a parliamentary 
majority (the Conservatives have 16 MSPs plus the Presiding Officer), but it represents an 
important source of support in exchange for policy concessions.  The best indicator of its 
effect can be found in the annual budget bill process.     In the first budget, the Conservatives 
secured a greater commitment to funding new police officers and revisit drugs policy.  In the 
second, they secured a reduction in business rates.  In the third, they secured an independent 
review panel on future budgets and an agreement to publish online items of government 
expenditure of £25,000 or above.
x
  In two of three years, Conservative support proved to be 
sufficient because Labour (46 seats) abstained in 2008 and the Liberal Democrats (16) 
abstained in 2010. Only in 2009 did both vote against the bill on the assumption that this 
would not lead to its failure (most expected the two Green MSPs (and Margo MacDonald) to 
vote with the SNP in exchange for increased funding for home insulation).   This failure was 
followed very quickly by a new bill, passed in a few weeks, that was almost identical to the 
old.   
The SNP’s relative lack of strength and stability within the Scottish Parliament contrasts to 
some extent with its position within government.  Its period in office has been relatively 
straightforward.  Its cabinet of six (compared to 12 in the coalition and over 20 in the UK) 
provides the potential for more meaningful cabinet decision making.  There have been no 
major tensions in policy aims comparable to those faced by the Scottish and UK coalitions.  
Its single-party status reduces the need to coordinate policymaking to the nth degree.  This 
lack of internal problems allows it to exploit the asymmetrical relationship between the 
Scottish Government and Parliament.  While the SNP has had to reduce its major legislative 
commitments, it has found that it can pursue many agendas without recourse to Parliament.  
Numerous policy aims (on intergovernmental relations, the civil service, capital finance 
projects, public service targets, curriculum reform, prescription charges) can be pursued 
without using legislation, while others can be pursued using the legislation that exists (i.e. 
with secondary legislation and regulations much less subject to parliamentary scrutiny).  
Further, most of the conditions associated with majority government still apply. Small 
committee size and MSP turnover still undermine the abilities of committees to scrutinize 
government policy and the huge gulf in resources remains.  While the opposition parties, if 
united (and bearing in mind that the Conservatives have been supportive of government on 
over 70% of motions), may be able to oppose certain measures, they do not have the 
resources to scrutinise policy in great detail or provide meaningful alternatives.   This 
situation is not altogether surprising because, despite the range of Scottish Parliament 
‘powers’, it was not designed to be a policy initiating body.  Rather, the institution represents 
an attempt to improve on the scrutiny powers of Westminster without marking a profound 
change in the executive-legislative relationship.  Committees have the power to hold 
ministers and civil servants to account, to make sure they consult properly and to initiate 
legislation as a last resort if MSPs believe that government policy is inadequate.   Yet, they 
are also instructed by the Consultative Steering Group (the group set up to produce the 
Scottish Parliament’s standing orders) to let the government govern, encouraged to play a 
minimal pre-legislative role and, in the case of the budget, not equipped to develop 
alternative legislation.  The Scottish Parliament even lacks Westminster’s equivalent of a 
‘scrutiny reserve’ for EU issues.     
The Scottish experience has given the parties a new impression of minority government that 
may influence party strategies in 2011.  For the two large parties, Labour and SNP, minority 
government represents an attractive option.  Minority government may allow a party to make 
up for its weakness in plenary with its strength in government staffing resources and a 
reduced need to make compromises within government.  Further, unlike in a majority 
coalition, defeats on parliamentary motions can be brushed off with relative ease.  However, 
it is difficult to identify enough policy influence for opposition parties to give them an 
incentive to eschew public office when it is available and support minority government.  This 
is not really an issue for the Conservatives who are not likely to be offered the chance to form 
a government and will therefore benefit more from minority government (note that there is no 
equivalent in the UK to the Scottish Conservative position).  However, the lack of policy 
influence enjoyed by the Liberal Democrats since 2007, compared to its coalition experience, 
seems to diminish the probability that it will accept minority government in the future.  If the 
Liberal Democrats in the UK (the only powerful smaller party) take notice of the Scottish 
experience, we may expect coalition government to be much more likely than minority.   
There are several additional reasons to expect more coalitions in the UK than Scotland.  First, 
UK policy responsibilities are more significant and the stakes are higher.  In Scotland there 
are fewer fundamental issues to polarise party opinion and produce damaging defeats.  The 
Scottish Parliament is not responsible for the big economic decisions on fiscal and monetary 
policy or taxation and redistribution.  Further, there is no Scottish equivalent to the agenda on 
welfare reform that is likely to divide the parties, or many other potential hot button topics 
that could produce significant conflict, such as defence policy and the future of Trident.  
Second, the effect of a perception of instability is more marked at the UK level. For example, 
there is no equivalent in Scotland to the idea that governing uncertainty ‘spooks the markets’.  
Third, the UK has a second chamber and the lack of a majority in Westminster may affect its 
relationship with the House of Lords (the extreme example would be a reduced ability to 
threaten to use the Parliament Act).  In each case, the larger party may be as likely to seek 
coalition as the smaller.  Fourth, the UK cannot draw on a developing culture of cooperation.  
In Scotland, PR elections produce an expectation that parties will always have to cooperate to 
some degree.  In the UK, we have no such clear expectations, even if we expect modern 
voting patterns to produce more hung parliaments than in the past.   
Yet, such differences may be exaggerated.  For example, under a plurality system the 
opposition parties have the chance to force an extraordinary election to further their positions 
following a short period of unsuccessful of government.  However, no party wants to be 
blamed for an extra election, particularly during a time of economic crisis.  Further, minority 
government is by no means limited to situations like Scotland’s where the stakes are 
relatively low.  Rather, according to Strom, it can be found in one-third of all parliamentary 
democracies.  
Conclusion: Lessons for the UK  
There are three main lessons to arise from this discussion.  First, coalition government 
secures government strength in Parliament but may make the task of government more 
complicated.  The Scottish Executive coalition operated effectively as a single party 
majoritarian government in the Westminster mould.  It dominated plenary and select 
committees, allowing it to pursue a wide variety of policy aims through legislation.  
However, the need for compromise and systematic cooperation provides the potential for 
weaker governing arrangements.  The process of coordination among parties can become 
rather convoluted, while the increase in reporting or accountability arrangements (to both 
ministers and parties) may exacerbate the diminished sense of accountability in one 
individual that we now encounter in an era of ‘governance’.  A majoritarian government is 
able to make decisions and initiate policy change quickly, without significant opposition.  A 
coalition or minority government may have to settle for one and not the other.   
Second, coalition arrangements may produce stability in Parliament but exacerbate tensions 
within parties.  In Scotland, the coalition majority, combined with a strong party whip, 
ensured a ‘settled programme’; the Executive passed virtually all of its legislation without 
any significant opposition or radical amendment and it suffered only a handful of defeats on 
non-binding motions over eight years.  At the same time, the need to produce a formal 
compromise produces occasional dissatisfaction, particularly among members of the larger 
party faced with a new obstacle to policy influence.  Given the slimness of the Conservative/ 
Liberal Democrat majority in Westminster, it will not take much of a rebellion to threaten the 
coalition’s position.   
Third, the Scottish experience suggests that minority government presents a realistic 
alternative to coalition, particularly when a party in opposition is willing to provide consistent 
parliamentary support in exchange for policy concessions.  However, the UK context may be 
more complicated.  The UK has no equivalent to the Scottish Conservatives: content to make 
deals in opposition because it has a minimal chance of being part of government (and because 
it may help the party’s profile in Scotland).  Instead, it has a single kingmaker in the shape of 
the Liberal Democrats, which might analyse the Scottish experience and find no incentive to 
remain in opposition.  The stakes are also higher in the UK, producing in parties a desire to 
seek stability in coalitions (particularly since they have no history of cooperation to draw 
upon).   
However, whether or not any lessons will be learned is another matter.  The general picture of 
lesson drawing in the UK is that the UK government prefers to learn policy lessons either 
from the US or from countries such as France or Germany that are of a similar size and face 
comparable problems.  It tends not to learn from the devolved territories.
xi
  In contrast, the 
Liberal Democrats are more likely to share lessons across the party.  For example, Jim 
Wallace (former deputy First Minister) advises its UK leadership from the Lords (and sits on 
key Lords committees), while David Laws MP was part of the negotiations in Scotland.  Both 
may draw on the suggestion that the civil service tends to be closer to the larger party during 
the initial negotiations.  The ‘triple lock’ system was also evident in Scotland (albeit in a 
different form).
xii
   
There are also shared concerns that point to the wider potential for shared ideas.  In 
particular, no party in the UK or devolved governments seem prepared for government 
formation.  Perhaps the association of a hung parliament with instability will change if the 
rules of government formation change or, more accurately, if the UK introduces some rules.  
The UK may also provide lessons for a future coalition government in Scotland.  In 
particular, it is the first coalition government to face the need for funding cuts.  In Scotland 
from 1999-2007 the coalition government enjoyed an unusual rise in its budget.  While it had 
to make compromises, the hard decisions were just not as hard.  The UK enjoys the first crisis 
coalition government.   
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